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Summary 
Few provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) have been as controversial as the individual 
mandate. Opponents of the mandate see it as a major cost to 
families who would rather spend their income elsewhere and 
a significant threat to individual freedom. Supporters view 
the mandate as essential to market based reform; without 
it, many healthy people would remain without insurance 
coverage, premiums for individuals and employers would 
escalate and insurance markets could become unstable. 
When the uninsured who can afford premiums do become 
ill, unaffordable health care costs often get shifted onto the 
rest of society. In this brief, we compare estimates of what 
costs and coverage for the nonelderly population would be 
under the ACA to a scenario in which the individual mandate 
is eliminated, but all other provisions of the ACA remain 
unchanged. This is what could happen, for example, if the 
legal challenges to the mandate were to succeed. For ease 
of comparison, these scenarios are simulated as if they were 
fully implemented in 2010.
In our simulation results, we find that:
•	The ACA would leave 8.3 percent of nonelderly persons 
without insurance coverage. If the mandate were 
eliminated, 14.9 percent would be uninsured. Currently, 
without the main coverage reforms of the ACA being 
implemented, an estimated 18.6 percent are uninsured. 
Thus, the number of uninsured would be cut by more 
than half with the mandate but by only about 20 percent 
without the mandate. 
•	Government spending on acute care for the nonelderly 
would increase by $69 billion under the ACA but would 
still rise by $50 billion under reform if the mandate 
were eliminated (multiyear provisions that offset these 
cost increases, such as Medicare and Medicaid cost 
savings and other cost-containment programs, were not 
simulated). This occurs because the government is still 
covering the less healthy uninsured without the mandate. 
•	Government funds used to reduce the number of 
uninsured would be used far more efficiently with the 
mandate than without it. Government spending per 
newly insured person would be $2,451 under the ACA,  
in contrast to $4,795 without the individual mandate. 
•	Total health care spending by employers is largely 
unchanged under the ACA from what it is today and 
decreases by 7.2 percent under a reform with no 
mandate, but this is largely because fewer people would 
have employer-sponsored coverage without the mandate.
•	 Individual spending would be somewhat higher under 
the ACA than with no reform, almost all because so many 
more people gain coverage and begin to make payments 
toward premiums. Some also pay individual mandate 
penalties. Were the mandate to be dropped, individual 
spending would be lower than it is without reform 
because fewer would be covered and there would be no 
penalties, but also because many would save due to lower 
premiums in the exchange.
•	Uncompensated care would decline by $42.4 billion 
under the ACA, but only by $14.7 billion under reform 
without a mandate because of the large number of people 
remaining uninsured. Reductions in uncompensated care 
would allow the federal and state governments to reduce 
spending on programs that now support the uninsured 
(not included in the government spending item included 
above) and could also result in lower private premiums 
and higher provider revenue.
•	We estimate that overall health system spending would 
increase by $53.1 billion, or 4.5 percent, under the ACA 
and would decrease by $10.2 billion or 0.9 percent, if 
the mandate were dropped. Note that our health care 
spending results are single-year estimates based on 
2010 costs. Multiyear provisions that would offset these 
costs, such as Medicare and Medicaid savings and cost-
containment, were not simulated.
The bottom line is that the individual mandate is an 
essential component of the overall package, working with 
the Medicaid expansion, exchanges, premium subsidies, 
and market reforms to achieve the goal of greatly reducing 
the number of uninsured. There would be 17.8 million 
more people left uninsured after reform if the individual 
mandate were eliminated, with relatively little reduction 
in government spending. By requiring individuals who 
can afford it to contribute to the cost of the health care 
services they consume, the individual mandate uses 
government funds for reducing the number of uninsured 
more efficiently. The finding that uncompensated care 
costs are much higher without the mandate suggests that 
populations that would be uninsured without the mandate 
are essentially free riders shifting the costs of care they 
inevitably need onto the rest of society. 
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Introduction 
Few provisions of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) have 
been as controversial as the individual 
mandate, the legal requirement for most 
Americans to be covered by a health 
insurance plan that meets certain minimal 
standards. Many object to the mandate 
on individual liberty grounds. Supporters 
of the mandate, including policy 
experts as well as insurers, insist that it 
is a critical component to the effective 
implementation of comprehensive health 
care reform. Three important goals of 
reform are to increase health insurance 
coverage, to eliminate discrimination by 
health status in the sale and maintenance 
of health insurance, and to increase 
the affordability of coverage. Without 
an individual mandate, these would all 
be affected by the natural tendency for 
people to want to pay for health insurance 
only when they believe they will need 
health care services. Since those currently 
without insurance have significantly 
lower costs on average than those paying 
for insurance, the mandate will bring 
lower-cost people into the insurance 
risk pools. This would lower the average 
cost per person covered and thus lower 
premiums.1 
In this brief, we compare the ACA to 
a scenario in which the individual 
mandate is eliminated, but other 
provisions of the ACA remain 
unchanged. This is what could happen, 
for example, if a legal challenge to the 
mandate were to succeed.2 In particular, 
we compare the effects of each scenario 
on the distribution of different types 
of health insurance coverage, on those 
without health insurance, and on 
overall health care spending by the 
government, employers, and individuals.
The Individual Mandate  
in the ACA 
Beginning in 2014, most Americans will 
be required to have health insurance 
coverage meeting certain minimum 
requirements and will be subject to 
financial penalties if they do not comply. 
Undocumented immigrants, Native 
Americans, prisoners, and those below 
the tax filing threshold will be exempt 
from the mandate. Exemptions will also 
be granted for hardships in obtaining 
coverage, religious conscience, situations 
in which no affordable insurance 
coverage is available.3 The penalty will 
be assessed and collected under the tax 
code, except that there is no criminal 
prosecution or additional penalty for 
missing payment deadlines, and neither 
liens nor levies can be used. Providers 
of applicable insurance plans are 
required to report relevant information 
to the Internal Revenue Service and to 
beneficiaries.
The penalty is computed as the 
maximum of a flat dollar amount per 
person without qualifying insurance 
coverage and a percentage of the family’s 
income above the tax filing threshold 
for those without qualifying insurance 
coverage. Both the flat dollar amount 
and the income percentage are phased 
in gradually from 2014 to 2016. In 2016, 
the flat dollar amount is $695 for an 
individual, and up to three times that for 
a family. The income percentage in 2016 
is 2.5. The penalty cannot exceed the 
applicable national average premium for 
bronze-level health insurance coverage 
offered through exchanges.4 
Methods
To estimate the effects of health reform 
and the individual mandate, we use the 
Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model (HIPSM).5 HIPSM 
simulates the decisions of businesses 
and individuals in response to policy 
changes, such as Medicaid expansions, 
new health insurance options, subsidies 
for the purchase of health insurance, 
and insurance market reforms. The 
model provides estimates of changes 
in government and private spending, 
premiums, rates of employer offers of 
coverage, and health insurance coverage 
resulting from specific reforms.6 
We simulate the main coverage 
provisions of the ACA is if they were 
fully implemented in 2010 and compare 
results to the HIPSM baseline results for 
2010 prior to implementation of these 
reforms. This approach differs from that 
of the Congressional Budget Office or the 
CMS actuaries who by necessity provide 
10-year estimates. Our approach permits 
more direct comparisons of reform with 
the pre-reform baseline and of various 
reform scenarios with each other. The 
key coverage provisions of the ACA and 
their implications for coverage and costs 
were summarized in an earlier policy 
brief.7 To demonstrate the effect of the 
individual mandate, we also simulate 
a health reform with the individual 
mandate omitted but including the other 
coverage provisions of the ACA. This 
allows us to estimate what could result 
if, for example, legal challenges to the 
mandate were to succeed.
To model the individual mandate, we 
begin with the baseline HIPSM model, 
in which behavior is calibrated to agree 
with results from the empirical health 
economics literature. The resulting 
model behavior is applicable for a 
voluntary health insurance regime, 
whereas we must also simulate how 
behavior would change in the presence 
of a mandate. Since a similar law only 
exists in Massachusetts after its health 
reforms, the only available empirical 
data are from that state.8 Our simulation 
of how behavior would change under 
the mandate has three components: 
1. The applicable financial penalty. 
A computation of whether the 
penalty is applicable and the amount 
of the penalty as defined by the 
law, i.e., the fully phased in amount 
discounted to present dollars. 
2. An additional “disutility” of not 
complying with the mandate. 
The mandate is more than a dollar 
amount, it is a legal requirement. 
Desire to comply with the law, or at 
least to avoid enforcement and the 
stigma of noncompliance, can lead to 
behavioral responses much stronger 
than the amount of the nominal 
penalty would suggest as appears to 
be the case in Massachusetts. The 
mandate has the effect of making 
being uninsured less desirable. We 
operationalize this in the model 
by applying an additional “psychic 
penalty” to being uninsured.9 
3. A relatively small “spillover” 
disutility of being uninsured 
on populations not bound by 
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the mandate. The mandate in 
Massachusetts was associated with 
an increase in coverage among those 
not actually bound by the mandate. 
We assume that this association was 
driven, in part, by a spillover effect of 
the mandate on those who were not 
bound by it who either mistakenly 
assumed they were or who reacted to 
a new social norm to have coverage. 
In addition to uncertainty about 
the current applicability of the 
mandate, people may also be making 
a judgment about whether they will 
lose their mandate exemption in 
the future due to rising income. For 
those exempt from the mandate, the 
amount of additional disutility of 
being uninsured is far smaller than  
for those bound by the mandate. 
Results
Changes in Health  
Insurance Coverage
We begin by examining how the 
distribution of health insurance coverage 
differs in the three scenarios simulated. 
Table 1 gives detailed results, while 
Figure 1 shows the percentages of 
nonelderly persons with various types 
of coverage. Without health reform, 
18.6 percent of nonelderly persons 
(49.9 million) would be without health 
insurance.10 Under the ACA, there would 
be a dramatic increase in coverage: only 
8.3 percent (22.1 million) would be 
without insurance. As we have shown in 
an earlier policy brief, nearly two-fifths 
of these are eligible for Medicaid or CHIP 
but have not enrolled, and just over a 
quarter are undocumented immigrants 
barred from the benefits of health 
reform.11 If the individual mandate were 
dropped, insurance coverage would be 
significantly lower; 14.9 percent (39.8 
million) would be without insurance.
Without a mandate, the net increase in 
insurance coverage is due entirely to 
the expansion of Medicaid. In fact, the 
share of nonelderly persons covered by 
private health insurance would actually 
decline from 62.1 percent without reform 
to 61 percent under reform with no 
mandate, largely because some would 
leave private coverage to enroll in the 
expanded Medicaid program or to take 
advantage of subsidies in the exchanges.12 
With a mandate, enrollment in the new 
health insurance exchanges as well as in 
employer-sponsored insurance would be 
noticeably higher, with 66.3 percent of the 
nonelderly covered by private insurance.
Without health reform, 42.9 million 
nonelderly Americans would be enrolled 
in Medicaid or CHIP. Under health reform, 
eligibility for Medicaid will be expanded 
to 133 percent of the federal poverty level 
with a 5 percent income disregard.13 This 
is the same with or without a mandate, 
so we would see a significant increase in 
enrollment under either reform scenario 
(55.6 million without a mandate and 59.7 
million with a mandate). The mandate 
would increase Medicaid enrollment 
by several million people, due to the 
behavioral effects we describe above.
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Figure 1. Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of the Non-Elderly
Without reform Reform with mandate
Reform without 
mandate
Coverage (in millions)
Private 166.4 62.1% 177.5 66.3% 164.0 61.2%
Employer (non-exchange) 151.6 56.6% 130.4 48.7% 127.4 47.6%
Nongroup (non-exchange) 14.8 5.5% 3.3 1.2% 2.6 1.0%
Exchange employer n.a. n.a. 20.7 7.7% 18.2 6.8%
Exchange nongroup n.a. n.a. 23.1 8.7% 15.7 5.8%
Medicaid/CHIP 42.9 16.0% 59.7 22.3% 55.5 20.7%
Other (including Medicare) 8.7 3.2% 8.7 3.2% 8.7 3.2%
Uninsured 49.9 18.6% 22.1 8.3% 39.8 14.9%
Table 1.  Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of the Nonelderly  
in Baseline and Reform
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Note: We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
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The Uninsured
Most of the impact of eliminating the 
mandate would fall on those below 
200 percent of the FPL. Without health 
reform, the uninsured are heavily 
concentrated among those with incomes 
below 200 percent of the federal poverty 
level (FPL). Under the ACA, there 
would be only 13.7 million uninsured 
in this income group, as opposed to 
33.1 million uninsured without reform 
(Figure 2). Under health reform with 
no mandate, the number of uninsured 
nonelderly persons below 200 percent  
of the FPL would be 21 million, 7.3 
million more than with the mandate.
Changes in Health Care Spending
Figure 3 shows how spending on acute 
care for the nonelderly would differ 
without reform, with reform excluding 
the mandate, and with reform including 
the individual mandate. As noted earlier, 
we do not simulate offsetting multiyear 
cost control provisions or provisions 
such as eliminating enhanced payments 
to Medicare HMOs. Single-year estimates 
based on 2010 costs are presented, 
which do not reflect the effects of 
multiyear cost savings and Medicare and 
Medicaid cost savings. Under the ACA, 
the amount spent on uncompensated 
care would fall from $70 billion in 
the baseline to $27 billion due to the 
expansion of health insurance coverage. 
Spending by individuals would increase 
from $340 billion to $370 billion. 
Many more people would purchase 
insurance; this cost would be partially 
offset by cost savings in the exchanges. 
Employer spending would decline 
slightly. Government spending on acute 
care for the nonelderly would rise 
from $244 billion to $313 billion due 
to the Medicaid expansion and various 
subsidies. In total, system spending on 
health care would rise 4.5 percent from 
$1,168 billion without reform to $1,221 
billion under the ACA. 
If the mandate were dropped from 
health reform, uncompensated care 
would rise to $55 billion because there 
would be many more without health 
insurance. Individual and employer 
spending would fall somewhat due 
to cost savings in the exchanges 
and a decline in private health 
insurance coverage. Government 
spending would decline modestly 
to $294 billion, $19 billion less than 
with the mandate; government 
spending remains high because 
without a mandate, reform covers a 
large number of less healthy people. 
Overall, acute health care spending by 
the nonelderly would be $1,157 billion, 
modestly lower than with no reform, 
primarily because Medicaid and the 
costs of exchange plans substitute for 
higher cost private insurance.
Table 2 shows more detail on how 
government spending on acute health 
care for the nonelderly changes under the 
three scenarios simulated. Government 
costs are significantly higher under the 
ACA because of the Medicaid expansion, 
as well as subsidies for exchange 
coverage and small employers. Under 
the ACA, spending on acute care for the 
nonelderly through Medicaid and CHIP 
would increase by $53.6 billion; $37.5 
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billion would be spent on total subsidies 
(premium, cost-sharing, and employer). 
Offsetting some of this spending, $17.6 
billion would be collected in employer 
assessments and $4.3 billion in individual 
mandate penalties.
If the mandate were dropped from 
health reform, Medicaid and CHIP 
spending would fall by $12.6 billion. 
Eliminating the mandate does not affect 
eligibility for these programs, but does 
reduce the enrollment of those eligible. 
Total spending on subsidies (premium, 
cost-sharing, and employer) would 
be $26.8 billion, and the government 
would collect $17.8 billion in employer 
assessments. The lower exchange 
enrollment without a mandate leads to 
lower, but still substantial, premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies. Without a 
mandate, there is less worker demand 
for ESI coverage and thus lower rates of 
employers offering coverage and lower 
rates of workers taking up offers. As a 
result, employer subsidies are lower and 
assessments are higher.
Under the ACA, total employer health 
care spending would decrease slightly 
(Table 3). Employers would have lower 
premium contributions because of 
cost savings in the exchange and small 
employers would benefit from subsidies, 
but at the same time face significant 
employer assessments. 
Without a mandate, total employer 
health care spending would decline 
compared with the ACA by $34 billion 
or 6.7 percent (from $510.2 billion to 
$476.3 billion). Employer spending 
with no mandate is significantly 
lower than spending under the ACA 
due primarily to the total spent in 
ESI premium contributions. Nearly 7 
million more people are covered by 
employer-sponsored insurance when 
the individual mandate is in effect than 
under reform without a mandate. 
Individual spending on acute care for 
the nonelderly would be $29.5 billion 
higher under the ACA than without 
reform, $370.0 billion versus $340.5 
billion. This is due to the substantial 
expansion of private insurance 
coverage. This is partially offset by 
savings in the exchanges. Note that 
out-of-pocket cost sharing declines 
significantly even with increased 
coverage. This means that insurance 
coverage under the ACA is in general 
more comprehensive than without 
reform due to the Medicaid expansion 
and insurance market reforms, 
particularly in the nongroup market. 
Those below 200 percent of the FPL 
would see a substantial reduction in 
their spending, $10.7 billion, due the 
exchange subsidies and the Medicaid 
expansion. Those with higher incomes 
would pay more in total due to 
spending by those newly purchasing 
private insurance. 
Without a mandate, individual 
spending would be $332.2 billion, 
much lower than under the ACA. 
Individual spending falls without a 
mandate because of the decline in 
private coverage. Health reform with 
the individual mandate would cover 18 
million more people than without the 
mandate. Of these, 14.5 million would 
be covered by private health insurance 
and would have to pay some share of 
the premiums for this coverage. 
Uncompensated care provided to the 
uninsured is currently a substantial cost 
Without 
reform
(in millions)
Reform with 
mandate
(in millions)
Change
(in millions)
Reform 
without 
mandate
(in millions)
Change
(in millions)
Government Spendinga
Medicaid/SCHIP $244,180 $297,740 $53,560 $285,070 $40,890
Premium subsidies n.a. $26,860 $26,860 $18,578 $18,578
Cost-sharing subsidies n.a. $6,090 $6,090 $4,543 $4,543
Employer subsidies n.a. $4,479 $4,479 $3,738 $3,738
Individual mandates n.a. -$4,290 -$4,290 n.a. n.a.
Employer assessments n.a. -$17,601 -$17,601 -$17,761 -$17,761
Net government spending $244,180 $313,277 $69,097 $294,168 $49,988
Without 
reform
(in millions)
Reform with 
mandate
(in millions)
Change
(in millions)
Reform 
without 
mandate
(in millions)
Change
(in millions)
Employer Spending
ESI premiums $513,293 $494,068 -$19,225 $459,579 -$53,714
Employer assessments n.a. $17,601 $17,601 $17,761 $17,761
Voucher amount n.a. $2,995 $2,995 $2,688 $2,688
Employer subsidies n.a. -$4,479 -$4,479 -$3,738 -$3,738
Net employer spending $513,293 $510,185 -$3,108 $476,290 -$37,003
Table 2.  Health Care Spending of the Government
Table 3.  Health Care Spending of Employers
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Note: We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
aSpending on acute care for the non-elderly.
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Note: We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
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for federal, state, and local governments, 
health care providers, and others. 
Hadley et al. (2008) find that about 
three-quarters of uncompensated care 
is financed by federal, state, and local 
governments, through DSH payments, 
and other programs.14 Under the ACA, 
uncompensated care declines by $42.3 
billion to $27 billion (Figure 3). Without 
a mandate, uncompensated care would 
remain high ($55 billion) due to the 
additional 18 million people without 
health insurance. Programs that support 
uncompensated care would have to be 
largely maintained. 
Government Costs per  
Newly Insured
Because the uninsured are heavily 
concentrated in the income groups 
eligible for Medicaid and exchange 
subsidies, it makes sense to consider 
the government costs per newly-
insured person (here the government 
costs of acute care for the nonelderly) 
as a measure of the efficiency of a 
health reform scenario. The difference 
between reform with and without an 
individual mandate is dramatic. Without 
a mandate, the average cost per newly-
insured would be $4,795; under the ACA 
it would be far lower, $2,451 (Figure 
4). The increase in coverage without 
a mandate was due entirely to the 
Medicaid expansion, so that nearly all 
newly insured have their costs borne 
by the government. With the ACA’s 
individual mandate, half of the newly 
insured would have private coverage 
and half public coverage.
Premiums in the Exchanges
An important argument used by 
advocates of an individual mandate 
is that there would be substantial 
adverse selection in the exchange 
without it, leading to higher premiums. 
Our simulation confirms that adverse 
selection would result, but the amount 
is not large (Table 5). The reason for this 
is the presence of premium and cost-
sharing subsidies. Under the ACA, we 
estimate that about two thirds of those 
covered in the nongroup exchanges 
would be in the subsidy eligibility 
range.15 As we have seen, exchange 
enrollment would be significantly 
lower without a mandate, but most of 
the difference would come from those 
above the subsidy eligibility threshold. 
Those eligible for subsidies are on 
average younger than the population 
at large and have lower average costs. 
Thus, there would be a large pool of 
lower-than-average-cost enrollees in the 
exchanges with or without a mandate, 
moderating the effects of adverse 
selection.16 If subsidies are reduced or 
eroded over time, our model would 
show greater adverse selection.
CBO estimates that the average 
premium per person covered in new 
nongroup policies would be 10-13 
percent higher under reform with a 
mandate in 2016 than under current 
law.17 They also estimate, that without 
a mandate, such premiums would 
rise 15-20 percent. The difference in 
these ranges is their estimate of the 
magnitude of adverse selection.18 Our 
premium changes are at the low end of 
their range. We simulate the nongroup 
and ESI exchanges pooled together; 
if they were separate, the adverse 
selection effects of eliminating the 
mandate would be somewhat higher.
Conclusion
Without a mandate, many more 
would be uninsured. We find that 
health reform as passed with an 
individual mandate would reduce the 
uninsured by 27.8 million people. 
Reform without the mandate would 
reduce the number of nonelderly 
Americans without health insurance 
by 10.1 million relative to the number 
who are uninsured today. Without the 
mandate, the coverage gains would be 
entirely due to the Medicaid expansion, 
as the number of people covered by 
private insurance would be slightly 
lower than without health reform. 
Without a mandate, insurance coverage 
(public and private) increases only 
among those with the lowest incomes. 
In contrast, with the mandate, the ACA 
reduces the number of uninsured at all 
income levels and increases the number 
of people with private health insurance. 
Without a mandate, fewer people 
would have employer-sponsored 
insurance. Under the ACA, 151.1 million 
people would have employer coverage, 
which is similar to the number who have 
such coverage now. Without a mandate, 
only 145.6 million would be covered 
by ESI. The presence of the individual 
mandate would not have a large effect 
on the number offered ESI through the 
health insurance exchanges, but the 
nongroup exchanges would cover far 
fewer people without the mandate (15.7 
million versus 23.1 million). 
Without 
reform
(in millions)
Reform with 
mandate
(in millions)
Change
(in millions)
Reform 
without 
mandate
(in millions)
Change
(in millions)
Individual Spending
Net out-of-pocket premiums $180,786 $211,538 $30,752 $178,728 -$2,057
Net out-of-pocket cost-sharing $159,694 $158,428 -$1,266 $153,503 -$6,191
Total individual spending $340,479 $369,966 $29,487 $332,231 -$8,248
Distribution by income
<200% FPL $70,513 $59,824 -$10,689 $55,033 -$15,480
200-399% FPL $100,316 $112,871 $12,555 $96,238 -$4,079
>400% FPL $169,650 $197,271 $27,621 $180,961 $11,311
Table 4. Health Care Spending of Individuals
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Note: We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
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Government spending would still 
increase significantly without a 
mandate. Government spending on 
acute care for the nonelderly would 
increase significantly under either 
health reform scenario: by $50 billion 
without a mandate and by $69.1 billion 
with the mandate. This includes 
spending on Medicaid, subsidies for 
coverage in the exchanges and subsidies 
to small employers. This spending is 
reduced by the amount collected in 
employer assessments and individual 
mandate penalties. There is a dramatic 
difference in the efficiency of this 
additional government spending. The 
spending per newly insured person 
would be $4,795 under reform without  
a mandate, but only $2,451 under 
the ACA with the mandate. Note that 
spending here is based on projected 
health care costs for 2010 and do not 
reflect the effects of multiyear cost-
containment provisions and Medicare 
and Medicaid cost savings.
Employer spending would be lower 
without a mandate. Employers would 
spend less on health care overall under 
voluntary health reform than they 
would with no health reform because 
of less coverage and the cost savings in 
the new ESI (SHOP) exchanges available 
to firms of up to 100 workers and to a 
slight decline in overall ESI enrollment. 
Under the ACA with the mandate, they 
would spend more than without reform 
due to increased enrollment. However, 
the differences in both cases are 
relatively small (about 4 percent). 
Individual spending would be lower 
without the mandate. Individuals 
would spend very slightly less on 
health care under voluntary reform 
than they would with no reform, and 
would spend 8.7 percent more under 
the ACA than with no reform. This 
increase in spending is due almost 
entirely to premiums and individual 
mandate penalties paid by those 
uninsured without reform with incomes 
too high to qualify for Medicaid. The 
increase in health insurance coverage 
under reform with no mandate is due 
entirely to the Medicaid expansion, 
and the government bears the costs for 
these persons. Health reform with the 
mandate would cover 18 million more 
people than without it, 14.5 million of 
whom would be covered by private 
insurance and would pay premiums that 
they did not pay before. 
Uncompensated care would remain 
high without a mandate. The amount 
spent on uncompensated care for the 
uninsured decreases by $42.3 billion 
under the ACA, but by only $14.7 
billion without a mandate, relative to 
no reform. The larger reduction under 
the ACA with the mandate would allow 
the federal and state governments to 
reduce spending on programs that now 
support the uninsured and could also 
result in lower private premiums and 
higher provider revenue.19 This suggests 
that the lower level of individual 
spending and higher uninsured rates 
without a mandate reflects, in part, the 
shifting the costs of health care that the 
uninsured will inevitably need and use 
onto the rest of society. 
Our simulation results show that the 
market-based provisions of the ACA 
would not expand private insurance 
coverage without an individual mandate. 
The additional demand for private 
insurance due to exchange subsidies 
would be counter-balanced by other 
factors such as the Medicaid expansion. 
Without a mandate, the net expansion 
of coverage is limited to those eligible 
for Medicaid or CHIP. Thus, health 
reform without a mandate would incur 
a substantial government cost not very 
different from the cost of the ACA while 
covering far fewer people. 
The Medicaid expansion and exchange 
subsidies, coupled with the mandate, 
would make a substantial dent in the 
number of uninsured, a result that 
does not occur if the mandate were 
eliminated. The individual mandate, 
with income related subsidies, is 
essential to market based reform 
Reform with 
Mandate2
Reform without 
Mandate
Single $4,105 $4,246
Family $11,202 $11,605
Table 5.  Average Premiums Paid 
by Policyholders in the 
Nongroup Exchanges1
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
1 Averaged over all benefit levels in the exchanges.
2  We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully 
implemented in 2010.
$0
$1200
$2400
$3600
$4800
$6000
Reform without mandateReform with mandate
$2,451Go
ve
rn
m
en
t c
os
t p
er
 n
ew
ly
-in
su
re
d
$4,795
Figure 4.  Government Costs per Newly-Insured Person
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because it reduces adverse selection and 
broadens the sharing of risk. Requiring 
individuals to have coverage once 
financial assistance is made available 
dramatically reduces the costs that 
are shifted on to others in the form of 
uncompensated care. The mandate also 
lowers premiums by reducing adverse 
selection. We show that the extent of 
adverse selection in the ACA is mitigated 
by the subsidies. But if subsidies 
were less generous (as they will be 
eventually20) the impact of adverse 
selection will be more apparent.21 Those 
who remain uninsured without the 
mandate are essentially free riders who 
ultimately benefit from taxes or higher 
premiums paid by others.
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